Quantum mechanics is about quantum information by Bub, Jeffrey
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
04
08
02
0v
2 
 1
2 
A
ug
 2
00
4
Quantum Mechanics is About Quantum
Information
Jeffrey Bub
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland,
College Park, MD 20742
(E-mail: jbub@carnap.umd.edu)
November 1, 2018
Abstract
I argue that quantum mechanics is fundamentally a theory about the repre-
sentation and manipulation of information, not a theory about the mechanics of
nonclassical waves or particles. The notion of quantum information is to be under-
stood as a new physical primitive—just as, following Einstein’s special theory of
relativity, a field is no longer regarded as the physical manifestation of vibrations
in a mechanical medium, but recognized as a new physical primitive in its own
right.
1 Introduction
In several places [9, 10, 11], Cushing speculates about the possibility of an alternative
history, in which Bohm’s theory [4, 16] is developed as the standard version of quan-
tum mechanics, and suggests that in that case the Copenhagen interpretation, if it had
been proposed as an alternative to a fully developed Bohmian theory, would have been
summarily rejected. I quote from [10, pp. 352–353]:
. . . we can fashion a highly reconstructed but entirely plausible bit of par-
tially ‘counterfactual’ history as follows (all around 1925–1927). Heisen-
berg’s matrix mechanics and Schrödinger’s wave mechanics are formu-
lated and shown to be mathematically equivalent. Study of a classical
particle subject to Brownian motion . . . leads to a classical understanding
of the already discovered Schrödinger equation. A stochastic mechanics
underpins this interpretation with a visualizable model of microphenom-
ena and, so, a realistic ontology remains viable. Since stochastic mechan-
ics is quite difficult to handle mathematically, study naturally turns to the
mathematically equivalent linear Schrödinger equation. Hence, the Dirac
transformation theory and an operator formalism are available as a conve-
nience for further development of the mathematics to provide algorithms
for calculation.
. . .
A Bell-type theorem is proven and taken as convincing evidence that non-
locality is present in quantum phenomena. A no-signalling theorem for
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quantum mechanical correlations is established and this puts to rest Ein-
stein’s objections to the nonseparability of quantum mechanics. . . . This
could reasonably have been enough to overcome his objections to the non-
local nature of a de Broglie–Bohm interpretation of the formalism of quan-
tum mechanics. Because the stochastic theory is both nonlocal and inde-
terministic, whereas the de Broglie–Bohm model is nonlocal only and still
susceptible to a realist interpretation, Einstein might have made the transi-
tion to the latter type of theory.
That is, these developments, that could, conceptually and logically, have
taken place around 1927, could have overcome the resistance of Einstein
and of Schrödinger to supporting a de Broglie–Bohm program. . . . Bohm’s
interpretation would certainly have been possible in 1927. These models
and theories could be generalized to include relativity and spin. The pro-
gram is off and running. Finally, this causal interpretation can be extended
to quantum fields.
So, if, say, in 1927, the fate of the causal interpretation had taken a very
different turn and been accepted over the Copenhagen one, it would have
had the resources to cope with the generalizations essential for a broad-
based empirical adequacy. We could today have arrived at a very differ-
ent world view of microphenomena. If someone were then to present the
merely empirically equally as adequate Copenhagen version, with all of
its own additional counterintuitive and mind-boggling aspects, who would
listen? . . . However, Copenhagen got to the top of the hill first and, to most
practicing scientists, there seems to be no point in dislodging it.
Cushing’s broader and very interesting thesis was that the successful theories that
philosophers of science analyze as case-studies are themselves contingent on historical
factors—in particular, the success of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum me-
chanics is a matter of historical contingency. I want to play Cushing’s counterfactual
game for the case of special relativity and compare this with the quantum mechanical
case to argue for a very different thesis: the interpretation of quantum mechanics as
a theory about the representation and manipulation of information in our world, not a
theory about the mechanics of nonclassical waves or particles.
The following discussion is divided into three sections. In ‘Principle vs Construc-
tive Theories,’ I discuss Einstein’s distinction between these two classes of theories,
and the significance of his characterization of special relativity as a principle theory. I
conclude the section by arguing that, just as the rejection of Lorentz’s theory in favour
of special relativity (formulated in terms of Einstein’s two principles) involved taking
the notion of a field as a new physical primitive, so the rejection of Bohm’s theory
in favour of quantum mechanics—characterized via the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson (CBH)
theorem [7] in terms of three information-theoretic principles—involves taking the no-
tion of quantum information as a new physical primitive. (By ‘information’ here, I
mean information in the physical sense, measured classically by the Shannon entropy
and, in quantum mechanics, by the von Neumann entropy.) In ‘The CBH Character-
ization Theorem,’ I outline the content of the CBH theorem. Finally, in ‘Quantum
Information,’ I argue that, just as Einstein’s analysis (based on the assumption that we
live in a world in which natural processes are subject to certain constraints specified by
the principles of special relativity) shows that the mechanical structures in Lorentz’s
constructive theory (the ether, and the behaviour of electrons in the ether) are irrelevant
to a physical explanation of electromagnetic phenomena, so the CBH analysis (based
on the assumption that we live in a world in which there are certain constraints on
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the acquisition, representation, and communication of information) shows that the me-
chanical structures in Bohm’s constructive theory (the guiding field, the behaviour of
particles in the guiding field) are irrelevant to a physical explanation of quantum phe-
nomena. You can, if you like, tell a story along Bohmian, or similar, lines (as in other
‘no collapse’ interpretations) but, given the information-theoretic constraints, such a
story can, in principle, have no excess empirical content over quantum mechanics (just
as Lorentz’s theory, insofar as it is constrained by the requirement to reproduce the em-
pirical content of the principles of special relativity, can, in principle, have no excess
empirical content over Einstein’s theory).
2 Principle vs Constructive Theories
Einstein introduced the distinction between principle and constructive theories in an
article on the significance of the special and general theories of relativity that he wrote
for the London Times, which appeared in the issue of November 28, 1919 [13]:
We can distinguish various kinds of theories in physics. Most of them
are constructive. They attempt to build up a picture of the more complex
phenomena out of the material of a relatively simple formal scheme from
which they start out. Thus the kinetic theory of gases seeks to reduce me-
chanical, thermal, and diffusional processes to movements of molecules—
i.e., to build them up out of the hypothesis of molecular motion. When we
say that we have succeeded in understanding a group of natural processes,
we invariably mean that a constructive theory has been found which covers
the processes in question.
Along with this most important class of theories there exists a second,
which I will call ‘principle theories.’ These employ the analytic, not the
synthetic, method. The elements which form their basis and starting-point
are not hypothetically constructed but empirically discovered ones, general
characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to mathemat-
ically formulated criteria which the separate processes or the theoretical
representations of them have to satisfy. Thus the science of thermody-
namics seeks by analytical means to deduce necessary conditions, which
separate events have to satisfy, from the universally experienced fact that
perpetual motion is impossible.
Einstein’s point was that relativity theory is to be understood as a principle theory.
He returns to this theme in his ‘Autobiographical Notes’ [14, pp. 51–52], where he
remarks that he first tried to find a constructive theory that would account for the known
properties of matter and radiation, but eventually became convinced that the solution
to the problem was to be found in a principle theory that reconciled the constancy of
the velocity of light in vacuo for all inertial frames of reference, and the equivalence of
inertial frames for all physical laws (mechanical as well as electromagnetic):
Reflections of this type made it clear to me as long ago as shortly after
1900, i.e., shortly after Planck’s trailblazing work, that neither mechanics
nor electrodynamics could (except in limiting cases) claim exact validity.
By and by I despaired of the possibility of discovering the true laws by
means of constructive efforts based on known facts. The longer and the
more despairingly I tried, the more I came to the conviction that only the
discovery of a universal formal principle could lead us to assured results.
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The example I saw before me was thermodynamics. The general princi-
ple was there given in the theorem: the laws of nature are such that it is
impossible to construct a perpetuum mobile (of the first and second kind).
How, then, could such a universal principle be found?
A little later [14, p. 57], he adds:
The universal principle of the special theory of relativity is contained in the
postulate: The laws of physics are invariant with respect to the Lorentz-
transformations (for the transition from one inertial system to any other
arbitrarily chosen system of inertia). This is a restricting principle for
natural laws, comparable to the restricting principle for the non-existence
of the perpetuum mobile which underlies thermodyamics.
According to Einstein, two very different sorts of theories should be distinguished
in physics. One sort involves the reduction of a domain of relatively complex phenom-
ena to the properties of simpler elements, as in the kinetic theory, which reduces the
mechanical and thermal behavior of gases to the motion of molecules, the elementary
building blocks of the constructive theory. The other sort of theory is formulated in
terms of ‘no go’ principles that impose constraints on physical processes or events,
as in thermodynamics (‘no perpetual motion machines’). For an illuminating account
of the role played by this distinction in Einstein’s work, see the discussion by Martin
Klein in [23].
The special theory of relativity is a principle theory, formulated in terms of two
principles: the equivalence of inertial frames for all physical laws (the laws of electro-
magnetic phenomena as well as the laws of mechanics), and the constancy of the ve-
locity of light in vacuo for all inertial frames. These principles are irreconcilable in the
geometry of Newtonian space-time, where inertial frames are related by Galilean trans-
formations. The required revision yields Minkowski geometry, where inertial frames
are related by Lorentz transformations. Einstein characterizes the special principle of
relativity, that the laws of physics are invariant with respect to Lorentz transformations
from one inertial system to another, as ‘a restricting principle for natural laws, compa-
rable to the restricting principle for the non-existence of the perpetuum mobile which
underlies thermodynamics.’ (In the case of the general theory of relativity, the group of
allowable transformations includes all differentiable transformations of the space-time
manifold onto itself.) By contrast, the Lorentz theory [27], which derives the Lorentz
transformation from the electromagnetic properties of the ether, and assumptions about
the transmission of molecular forces through the ether, is a constructive theory.
Consider the transition:
Lorentz’s constructive mechanical theory of the electrodynamics of moving bodies
−→ Einstein’s principle theory of special relativity
−→ Minkowski’s formulation of Einstein’s theory in terms of a non-Euclidean space-
time geometry
Einstein showed that you could obtain a unified treatment of mechanical and electro-
magnetic phenomena—particles, electrons, light—by extending the idea of Galilean
relativity (in a suitably modified form, involving the Lorentz transformation between
inertial frames) to both mechanical and electromagnetic phenomena. In Minkowski’s
formulation of the theory, the relativistic principles are instantiated in a specific non-
Newtonian geometry of space-time. In this new framework, rigid bodies are excluded
by the symmetry group (i.e., they would transmit signals faster than light) and, strictly
speaking, particles (insofar as they are small rigid bodies) are excluded. Instead, the
field becomes the basic physical entity, as a new physical primitive. In particular,
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since an electromagnetic wave is not reduced to the vibratory motion of a mechanical
medium (as a sound wave is reducible to the notion of air molecules), the ether is no
longer required as the medium for the physical instantiation of an electromagnetic field.
Now compare the historical transition:
Lorentz’s constructive theory
−→ Einstein’s principle theory
−→ Minkowski space-time
with the transition in a modified version of Cushing’s counterfactual history:
Bohm’s constructive theory
−→ X
−→ Hilbert space quantum mechanics
That is (for comparison with the relativistic case), assume that Bohm’s theory was
actually developed before Hilbert space quantum mechanics as a solution to some of
the experimental difficulties of classical mechanics at the turn of the 20’th century, and
that there was an additional development, something like an Einsteinian formulation of
quantum mechanics as a principle theory (the ‘X’).
Without the ‘X’ step, the Copenhagen argument for the completeness of Hilbert
space quantum mechanics (and the associated rejection of Bohm’s theory) in the coun-
terfactual world seems implausible, as Cushing suggests. Similarly, to consider another
counterfactual history, we might suppose that (after Lorentz’s theory) the special the-
ory of relativity was first formulated geometrically by Minkowski rather than Einstein,
as an algorithm for relativistic kinematics and the Lorentz transformation, which is in-
compatible with the kinematics of Newtonian space-time. Without Einstein’s analysis
of the theory as a principle theory along the lines sketched above, it seems implausi-
ble to suppose that Lorentz’s theory would have been dislodged by what would surely
have seemed to be merely a convenient (but ‘counterintuitive and mind-boggling’) al-
gorithm.
In the following section, I argue that the missing ‘X’ (in a logical sense) is supplied
by the CBH characterization theorem for quantum theory in terms of three information-
theoretic constraints and that, given this theorem, the relation between quantum me-
chanics and constructive theories like Bohm’s theory should be seen as analogous to
the relation between special relativity and Lorentz’s theory. Just as special relativity
involves a theory of the structure of space-time in which a field is a new physical prim-
itive not reducible to the motion of a mechanical medium (ultimately, to the motion of
particles), so quantum mechanics involves a theory of the algebraic structure of states
and observables in which information is a new physical primitive not reducible to the
behaviour of mechanical systems (the motion of particles or fields).
It should go without saying that I am not comparing the CBH theorem with Ein-
stein’s achievement in developing the special theory of relativity. To avoid any such
suggestion, which would be ludicrous, let me say what would perhaps be a compara-
ble achievement. Suppose, in a modified version of Cushing’s counterfactual history,
that in 1927 Bohm’s theory was the dominant research paradigm in quantum physics.
Suppose (in 1927) that CBH showed that one could dispense with the whole idea of
a source-less field in configuration space guiding the motion of particles by deriving
the current Hilbert space theory from three information-theoretic constraints, and in
terms of this (then new) Hilbert space theory also showed in detail how one could
treat various quantum systems, formerly treated in terms of Bohm’s theory, in a much
simpler way, and in particular brought out the implications of entanglement as a new
physical resource that could be exploited to develop novel forms of computation and
cryptographic procedures that were impossible classically (cf. E = mc2). In our ac-
tual history, since Hilbert space quantum mechanics and quantum information theory
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are already on the table, the CBH theorem is hardly more than a footnote to current
theory. The purpose in pointing to the analogy is to argue that the relevance of the
CBH theorem to the interpretative debate about Hilbert space quantum mechanics and
the significance of constructive mechanical theories like Bohm’s theory, is to be under-
stood as similar to the relevance of Einstein’s analysis of special relativity as a principle
theory to Minkowski’s geometric formulation of the theory and Lorentz’s constructive
mechanical ether theory.
3 The CBH Characterization Theorem
The CBH characterization theorem is formulated in the general framework of C∗-
algebras, which allows a mathematically abstract characterization of a physical theory
that includes, as special cases, all classical mechanical theories of both wave and par-
ticle varieties, and all variations on quantum theory, including quantum field theories
(plus any hybrids of these theories, such as theories with superselection rules). So the
analysis is not restricted to the standard quantum mechanics of a system represented on
a single Hilbert space with a unitary dynamics, but is general enough to cover cases of
systems with an infinite number of degrees of freedom that arise in quantum field theory
and the thermodynamic limit of quantum statistical mechanics (in which the number
of microsystems and the volume they occupy goes to infinity, while the density defined
by their ratio remains constant), including the quantum theoretical description of exotic
phenomena such as Hawking radiation, black hole evaporation, Hawking information
loss, etc. The Stone-von Neumann theorem, which guarantees the existence of a unique
representation (up to unitary equivalence) of the canonical commutation relations for
systems with a finite number of degrees of freedom, breaks down for such cases, and
there will be many unitarily inequivalent representations of the canonical commutation
relations. One could, of course, consider weaker mathematical structures, but it seems
that the C∗-algebraic machinery suffices for all physical theories that have been found
to be empirically successful to date, including phase space theories and Hilbert space
theories [24], and theories based on a manifold [8].
A C∗-algebra is essentially an abstract generalization of the structure of the algebra
of operators on a Hilbert space. Technically, a (unital)C∗-algebra is a Banach ∗-algebra
over the complex numbers containing the identity, where the involution operation ∗ and
the norm are related by ‖A∗A‖ = ‖A‖2. So the algebraB(H) of all bounded operators
on a Hilbert space H is a C∗-algebra, with ∗ the adjoint operation and ‖ ·‖ the standard
operator norm.
In standard quantum theory, a state on B(H) is defined by a density operator D
on H in terms of an expectation-valued functional ρ(A) = Tr(AD) for all observables
represented by self-adjoint operatorsA in B(H). This definition of ρ(A) in terms ofD
yields a positive normalized linear functional. So a state on a C∗-algebra C is defined,
quite generally, as any positive normalized linear functional ρ : C→ C on the algebra.
Pure states are defined by the condition that if ρ = λρ1 + (1 − λ)ρ2 with λ ∈ (0, 1),
then ρ = ρ1 = ρ2; other states are mixed.
The most general dynamical evolution of a system represented by a C∗-algebra
of observables is given by a completely positive linear map T on the algebra of ob-
servables, where 0 ≤ T (I) ≤ I . The map or operation T is called selective if
T (I) < I and nonselective if T (I) = I . A yes-no measurement of some idempo-
tent observable represented by a projection operator P is an example of a selective
operation. Here, T (A) = PAP for all A in the C∗-algebra C, and ρT , the trans-
formed (‘collapsed’) state, is the final state obtained after measuring P in the state ρ
and ignoring all elements of the ensemble that do not yield the eigenvalue 1 of P (so
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ρT (A) = ρ(T (A))/ρ(T (I)) when ρ(T (I)) 6= 0, and ρT = 0 otherwise). The time
evolution in the Heisenberg picture induced by a unitary operator U ∈ C is an example
of a nonselective operation. Here, T (A) = UAU−1. Similarly, the measurement of
an observable O with spectral measure {Pi}, without selecting a particular outcome,
is an example of a nonselective operation, with T (A) =
∑n
i=1
PiAPi. Note that any
completely positive linear map can be regarded as the restriction to a local system of a
unitary map on a larger system.
A representation of a C∗-algebra C is any mapping pi : C → B(H) that preserves
the linear, product, and ∗ structure of C. The representation is faithful if pi is one-to-
one, in which case pi(C) is an isomorphic copy of C. The Gelfand-Naimark theorem
says that every abstract C∗-algebra has a concrete faithful representation as a norm-
closed ∗-subalgebra of B(H), for some appropriate Hilbert space H. In the case of
systems with an infinite number of degrees of freedom (as in quantum field theory),
there are inequivalent representations of the C∗-algebra of observables defined by the
commutation relations.
The relation between classical theories and C∗-algebras is this: every commutative
C∗-algebra C is isomorphic to the set C(X) of all continuous complex-valued func-
tions on a locally compact Hausdorff space X . If C has a multiplicative identity, X is
compact. So behind every abstract abelian C∗-algebra there is a classical phase space
theory defined by this ‘function representation’ on the phase space X . Conversely, ev-
ery classical phase space theory defines a C∗-algebra. For example, the observables of
a classical system of n particles—real-valued functions on the phase space R6n—can
be represented as the self-adjoint elements of the C∗-algebra B(R6n) of all continu-
ous complex-valued functions f on R6n. The phase space R6n is locally compact and
can be made compact by adding just one point ‘at infinity,’ or we can simply consider
a closed and bounded (and thus compact) subset of R6n. The statistical states of the
system are given by probability measures µ on R6n, and pure states, corresponding to
maximally complete information about the particles, are given by the individual points
of R6n. The system’s state ρ in the C∗-algebraic sense is the expectation functional
corresponding to µ, defined by ρ(f) =
∫
R6n
fdµ.
So classical theories are characterized by commutative C∗-algebras. CBH identify
quantum theories with a certain subclass of noncommutativeC∗-algebras; specifically,
theories where (i) the observables of the theory are represented by the self-adjoint op-
erators in a noncommutative C∗-algebra (but the algebras of observables of distinct
systems commute), (ii) the states of the theory are represented by C∗-algebraic states
(positive normalized linear functionals on the C∗-algebra), and spacelike separated
systems can be prepared in entangled states that allow what Schrödinger [31, p. 556]
calls ‘remote steering’, and (iii) dynamical changes are represented by completely pos-
itive linear maps. For example, the standard quantum mechanics of a system with
a finite number of degrees of freedom represented on a single Hilbert space with a
unitary dynamics defined by a given Hamiltonian is a quantum theory, and theories
with different Hamiltonians can be considered to be empirically inequivalent quantum
theories. Quantum field theories for systems with an infinite number of degrees of free-
dom, where there are many unitarily inequivalent Hilbert space representations of the
canonical commutation relations, are quantum theories. (For a detailed discussion and
motivation for this identification, see [6, 7, 18, 19].)
What CBH showed was that one can derive the basic kinematic features of a quantum-
theoretic description of physical systems in the above sense from three fundamen-
tal information-theoretic constraints: (i) the impossibility of superluminal informa-
tion transfer between two physical systems by performing measurements on one of
them, (ii) the impossibility of perfectly broadcasting the information contained in an
unknown physical state (for pure states, this amounts to ‘no cloning’), and (iii) the
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impossibility of communicating information so as to implement a certain primitive
cryptographic protocol, called ‘bit commitment,’ with unconditional security. They
also partly demonstrated the converse derivation, leaving open a question concerning
nonlocality and bit commitment. This remaining issue has been resolved by Hans
Halvorson [17], so we have a characterization theorem for quantum theory in terms of
the three information-theoretic constraints.
To clarify the significance of the information-theoretic constraints, consider a com-
posite quantum system A+B, consisting of two subsystems, A and B. For simplicity,
assume the systems are identical, so their C∗-algebras A and B are isomorphic. The
observables of the component systems A and B are represented by the self-adjoint el-
ements of A and B, respectively. Let A ∨ B denote the C∗-algebra generated by A
and B. The physical states of A, B, and A+B, are given by positive normalized linear
functionals on their respective algebras that encode the expectation values of all ob-
servables (cf. standard quantum theory, where a state on B(H) is defined by a density
operator D on H in terms of an expectation-valued functional ρ(A) = Tr(AD) for all
observables represented by self-adjoint operatorsA in B(H).) To capture the idea that
A and B are physically distinct systems, CBH make the assumption that any state of A
is compatible with any state of B, i.e., for any state ρA of A and ρB of B, there is a
state ρ of A ∨B such that ρ|A = ρA and ρ|B = ρB .
The sense of the ‘no superluminal information transfer via measurement’ constraint
is that when Alice and Bob, say, perform local measurements, Alice’s measurements
can have no influence on the statistics for the outcomes of Bob’s measurements, and
conversely. That is, merely performing a local measurement cannot, in and of itself,
convey any information to a physically distinct system, so that everything ‘looks the
same’ to that system after the measurement operation as before, in terms of the expec-
tation values for the outcomes of measurements. CBH show that it follows from this
constraint that A and B are kinematically independent systems if they are physically
distinct in the above sense, i.e., every element of A commutes pairwise with every
element of B.
The ‘no broadcasting’ condition now ensures that the individual algebras A and B
are noncommutative. Broadcasting is a process closely related to cloning. In fact, for
pure states, broadcasting reduces to cloning. In cloning, a ready state σ of a system
B and the state to be cloned ρ of system A are transformed into two copies of ρ. In
broadcasting, a ready state σ of B and the state to be broadcast ρ of A are transformed
to a new state ω of A+B, where the marginal states of ω with respect to both A and B are
ρ. In elementary quantum mechanics, neither cloning nor broadcasting is possible in
general. A pair of pure states can be cloned if and only if they are orthogonal and, more
generally, a pair of mixed states can be broadcast if and only if they are represented by
mutually commuting density operators. CBH show that broadcasting and cloning are
always possible for classical systems, i.e., in the commutative case there is a universal
broadcasting map that clones any pair of input pure states and broadcasts any pair of
input mixed states. Conversely, they show that if any two states can be (perfectly)
broadcast, then any two pure states can be cloned; and if two pure states of a C∗-
algebra can be cloned, then they must be orthogonal. So, if any two states can be
broadcast, then all pure states are orthogonal, from which it follows that the algebra is
commutative.
The quantum mechanical phenomenon of interference is the physical manifestation
of the noncommutativity of quantum observables or, equivalently, the superposition of
quantum states. So the impossibility of perfectly broadcasting the information con-
tained in an unknown physical state, or of cloning or copying the information in an
unknown pure state, is the information-theoretic counterpart of interference.
Now, if A and B are noncommutative and mutually commuting algebras of observ-
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ables associated with distinct spatially separated systems, it can be shown that there are
nonlocal entangled states on theC∗-algebraA∨B they generate (see [25, 34, 1], and—
more relevantly here, in terms of a specification of the range of entangled states that can
be guaranteed to exist—[17]). So it seems that entanglement—what Schrödinger [31,
p. 555] called ‘the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its
entire departure from classical lines of thought’— follows automatically in any theory
with a noncommutative algebra of observables. That is, it seems that once we assume
‘no superluminal information transfer via measurement,’ and ‘no broadcasting,’ the
class of allowable physical theories is restricted to those theories in which physical
systems manifest both interference and nonlocal entanglement. But this conclusion is
surely too quick, since the derivation of entangled states depends on formal properties
of theC∗-algebraic machinery. Moreover, we have no assurance that two systems in an
entangled state will maintain their entanglement indefinitely as they separate in space,
which is the case for quantum entanglement. But this is precisely what is required by
the cheating strategy that thwarts secure bit commitment, since Alice will have to keep
one system of such a pair and send the other system to Bob, whose degree of spatial
separation from Alice is irrelevant, in principle, to the implementation of the protocol.
In an information-theoretic characterization of quantum theory, the fact that entangled
states of composite systems can be instantiated, and instantiated nonlocally so that the
entanglement of composite systems is maintained as the subsystems separate in space,
should be shown to follow from some information-theoretic principle. The role of the
‘no bit commitment’ constraint is to guarantee entanglement maintenance over dis-
tance, that is, the existence of a certain class of nonlocal entangled states—hence it
gives us nonlocality, not merely ‘holism.’
Bit commitment is a cryptographic protocol in which one party, Alice, supplies an
encoded bit to a second party, Bob, as a warrant for her commitment to 0 or 1. The
information available in the encoding should be insufficient for Bob to ascertain the
value of the bit at the initial commitment stage, but sufficient, together with further
information supplied by Alice at a later stage when she is supposed to ‘open’ the com-
mitment by revealing the value of the bit, for Bob to be convinced that the protocol
does not allow Alice to cheat by encoding the bit in a way that leaves her free to reveal
either 0 or 1 at will.
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard [3] proposed a quantum bit commitment protocol
now referred to as BB84. The basic idea was to encode the 0 and 1 commitments as
two quantum mechanical mixtures represented by the same density operator, ω. As
they showed, Alice can cheat by adopting an EPR attack or cheating strategy. Instead
of following the protocol and sending a particular mixture to Bob she prepares pairs
of particles A+B in the same entangled state ρ, where ρ|B = ω. She keeps one of
each pair (the ancilla A) and sends the second particle B to Bob, so that Bob’s particles
are in the mixed state ω. In this way she can reveal either bit at will at the opening
stage, by effectively steering Bob’s particles into the desired mixture via appropriate
measurements on her ancillas. Bob cannot detect this cheating strategy.
Mayers [28, 29], and Lo and Chau [26], showed that the insight of Bennett and
Brassard can be extended to a proof that a generalized version of the EPR cheating
strategy can always be applied, if the Hilbert space is enlarged in a suitable way by
introducing additional ancilla particles. The proof of this ‘no go’ quantum bit com-
mitment theorem exploits biorthogonal decomposition via a result by Hughston, Jozsa,
and Wootters [21]. Informally, this says that for a quantum mechanical system consist-
ing of two (separated) subsystems represented by the C∗-algebra B(H1) ⊗ B(H2),
any mixture of states on B(H2) can be generated from a distance by performing an ap-
propriate POV-measurement on the system represented by B(H1), for an appropriate
entangled state of the composite system B(H1) ⊗B(H2). Schrödinger [31, p. 556]
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called this ‘remote steering’ and found the possibility so physically counterintuitive
that he speculated [32, p. 451] (wrongly, as it turned out) that experimental evidence
would eventually show that this was simply an artifact of the theory, and that any en-
tanglement between two systems would spontaneously (and instantaneously) decay as
the systems separated in space. Remote steering is what makes it possible for Alice to
cheat in her bit commitment protocol with Bob. It is easy enough to see this for the
original BB84 protocol. Suprisingly, this is also the case for any conceivable quantum
bit commitment protocol. (See Bub [5] for a discussion.)
Now, unconditionally secure bit commitment is also impossible for classical sys-
tems, in which the algebras of observables are commutative.1 But the insecurity of
any bit commitment protocol in a noncommutative setting depends on considerations
entirely different from those in a classical commutative setting. Classically, uncon-
ditionally secure bit commitment is impossible, essentially because Alice can send
(encrypted) information to Bob that guarantees the truth of an exclusive classical dis-
junction (equivalent to her commitment to a 0 or a 1) only if the information is biased
towards one of the alternative disjuncts (because a classical exclusive disjunction is
true if and only if one of the disjuncts is true and the other false). No principle of
classical mechanics precludes Bob from extracting this information. So the security of
the protocol cannot be unconditional and can only depend on issues of computational
complexity.
By contrast, the noncommutativity of quantum mechanics allows the possibility of
different mixtures associated with the same density operator. If Alice sends Bob one of
two mixtures associated with the same density operator to establish her commitment,
then she is, in effect, sending Bob evidence for the truth of an exclusive disjunction
that is not based on the selection of a particular disjunct (‘0 or 1’). What thwarts the
possibility of using the ambiguity of mixtures in this way to implement an uncondi-
tionally secure bit commitment protocol is the existence of nonlocal entangled states,
and the maintenance of entanglement as entangled systems separate. This allows Alice
to cheat by preparing a suitable entangled state instead of one of the mixtures, where
the reduced density operator for Bob is the same as that of the mixture. Alice is then
able to steer Bob’s systems remotely into either of the two mixtures associated with the
alternative commitments at will. (See Bub [6] for a further discussion.)
So what would allow unconditionally secure bit commitment in a noncommuta-
tive theory is the spontaneous decay of entangled states of composite systems as the
component systems separate in space (specifically, the entangled state of the pair of
systems prepared by Alice, one of which she sends to Bob). One can therefore take
Schrödinger’s remarks (with hingdsight) as relevant to the question of whether or not
secure bit commitment is possible in our world. In effect, Schrödinger raised the possi-
bility that we live in a quantum-like world in which secure bit commitment is possible!
It follows that the impossibility of unconditionally secure bit commitment entails that,
for any mixed state that Alice and Bob can prepare by following some (bit commit-
1Adrian Kent [22] has shown how to implement a secure classical bit commitment protocol by exploiting
relativistic signalling constraints in a timed sequence of communications between verifiably separated sites
for both Alice and Bob. In a bit commitment protocol, as usually construed, there is a time interval of arbi-
trary length, where no information is exchanged, between the end of the commitment stage of the protocol
and the opening or unveiling stage, when Alice reveals the value of the bit. Kent’s ingenious scheme ef-
fectively involves a third stage between the commitment state and the unveiling stage, in which information
is exchanged between Bob’s sites and Alice’s sites at regular intervals until one of Alice’s sites chooses to
unveil the originally committed bit. At this moment of unveiling the protocol is not yet complete, because
a further sequence of unveilings is required between Alice’s sites and corresponding sites of Bob before
Bob has all the information required to verify the commitment at a single site. If a bit commitment pro-
tocol is understood to require an arbitrary amount of ‘free’ time between the end of the commitment stage
and the opening stage (in which no step is to be executed in the protocol), then unconditionally secure bit
commitment is impossible for classical systems. (I am indebted to Dominic Mayers for clarifying this point.)
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ment) protocol, there is a corresponding entangled state that remains entangled as the
component systems separate and pass between Alice and Bob.
To sum up: the content of the CBH theorem is that a quantum theory—a theory
where (i) the observables of the theory are represented by the self-adjoint operators
in a noncommutative C∗-algebra (but the algebras of observables of distinct systems
commute), (ii) the states of the theory are represented by C∗-algebraic states (positive
normalized linear functionals on the C∗-algebra), and spacelike separated systems can
be prepared in entangled states that allow remote steering, and (iii) dynamical changes
are represented by completely positive linear maps—can be characterized by the three
information-theoretic ‘no-go’s’: no superluminal communication of information via
measurement, no (perfect) broadcasting, and no (unconditionally secure) bit commit-
ment.
4 Quantum Information
The significance of the CBH theorem is that we can now see quantum mechanics as
a principle theory, where the principles are information-theoretic constraints. A rela-
tivistic theory is a theory characterized by certain symmetry or invariance properties,
defined in terms of a group of space-time transformations. Following Einstein’s for-
mulation of special relativity as a principle theory, we understand this invariance to be
a consequence of the fact that we live in a world in which natural processes are sub-
ject to certain constraints. (Recall Einstein’s characterization of the special principle
of relativity as ‘a restricting principle for natural laws, comparable to the restricting
principle of the non-existence of the perpetuum mobile which underlies thermodynam-
ics.’) CBH treat a quantum theory as a theory in which the observables and states have
a certain characteristic algebraic structure. So for CBH, ‘quantum’ is a structural ad-
jective applicable to theories, just as ‘relativistic’ is. Unlike relativity theory, quantum
mechanics was born as a recipe or algorithm for caclulating the expectation values of
observables measured by macroscopic measuring instruments. The interpretative prob-
lems arise because this Hilbert space theory has no phase space representation. Without
Einstein’s analysis, we could also see Minkowski space-time simply as an algorithm
for relativistic kinematics and the Lorentz transformation, which is incompatible with
the kinematics of Newtonian space-time. What Einstein’s analysis provides is a ratio-
nale for taking the structure of space-time as Minkowskian: we see that this is required
for the consistency of the two principles of special relativity. From this perspective, it
is also clear that, insofar as a constructive theory like Lorentz’s theory is constrained
by the requirement to reproduce the empirical content of the principles of special rela-
tivity (which means that the ether as a rest frame for electromagnetic phenomena must,
in principle, be undetectable), such a theory can have no excess empirical content over
special relativity. Cushing [10, p. 193] quotes Maxwell as asking whether ‘it is not
more philosophical to admit the existence of a medium which we cannot at present
perceive, than to assert that a body can act at a place where it is not.’ Yes, but not
if we also have to admit that, in principle, as a matter of physical law, if we live in a
world in which events are constrained by the two relativistic principles, the medium
must remain undetectable.
Consider again the transition:
Lorentz’s constructive theory
−→ special relativity as a principle theory (via Einstein’s analysis)
−→ Minkowski space-time
and the counterfactual history:
11
Bohm’s constructive theory
−→ quantum mechanics as a principle theory (via CBH)
−→ Hilbert space representation of states and observables
What the CBH analysis provides is a rationale for taking the structure of states and
observables associated with quantum phenomena as a noncommutative C∗-algebra,
represented on a Hilbert space with no phase space representation. From the CBH
theorem, a theory satisfies the information-theoretic constraints if and only if it is em-
pirically equivalent to a quantum theory (a theory where the observables, the states, and
the dynamics are represented as outlined at the end of Section 3). So if the information-
theoretic constraints are satisfied, a constructive theory like Bohm’s theory can have no
excess empirical content over a quantum theory. Just as in the case of Lorentz’s theory,
Bohm’s theory will have to posit contingent assumptions to hide the additional mechan-
ical structures (the hidden variables will have to remain hidden), so that in principle,
as a matter of physical law, there could not be any evidence favouring the theory over
quantum theory.
Consider how this is achieved in Bohm’s theory. The additional mechanical struc-
tures in Bohm’s theory are the particle trajectories in configuration space, and the wave
function as a guiding field. The dynamical evolution of a Bohmian particle is described
by a deterministic equation of motion in configuration space that is guaranteed to pro-
duce the quantum statistics for all quantum measurements, if the initial distribution over
particle positions (hidden variables) is the Born distribution. The Born distribution is
treated as an equilibrium distribution, and non-equilibrium distributions can be shown
to yield predictions that conflict with the information-theoretic constraints. Valentini
[35] shows how non-equilibrium distributions can be associated with such phenomena
as instantaneous signalling between spatially separated systems and the possibility of
distinguishing nonorthogonal pure states (hence the possibility of cloning such states).
Key distribution protocols whose security depends on ‘no information gain without dis-
turbance’ and ‘no cloning’ would then be insecure against attacks based on exploiting
such non-equilibrium distributions.
On Bohm’s theory, the explanation for the fact that the information-theoretic con-
straints hold in our universe is that the universe has in fact reached the equilibrium
state with respect to the distribution of hidden variables. But now it is clear that there
can be no empirical evidence for the additional structural elements of Bohm’s theory
that would represent excess empirical content over a quantum theory, because such ev-
idence is in principle unobtainable in the equilibrium state. If the information-theoretic
constraints apply at the phenomenal level then, according to Bohm’s theory, the uni-
verse must be in the equilibrium state, and in that case there can be no phenomena that
are not part of the empirical content of a quantum theory (i.e., the statistics of quantum
superpositions and entangled states). Since a similar analysis will apply to any ‘no
collapse’ hidden variable theory—this, in effect, is what the ‘no go’ hidden variable
theorems tell us: any such theory will have to incorporate the basic features of Bohm’s
theory—the additional non-quantum structural elements that these theories postulate
cannot be doing any work in providing a physical explanation of quantum phenomena
that is not already provided by an empirically equivalent quantum theory.
Of course, it could be the case that we are mistaken about the information-theoretic
constraints, and that some day we will find experimental evidence that conflicts with
the predictions of a quantum theory. The above claim about constructive theories like
Bohm’s theory is a conditional claim about what follows if the information-theoretic
constraints do in fact hold in our world. To put the point differently: an acceptable
mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of our measur-
ing instruments as well as the phenomena they reveal must violate at least one of the
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information-theoretic constraints.
What led to Lorentz’s theory was a problem about the electromagnetic field, con-
ceived as an aspect of the motion of a mechanical medium. The rejection of Lorentz’s
constructive theory in favour of Einstein’s principle theory requires that we consider a
field as a new physical primitive, not reducible to the motion of particles or a mechan-
ical medium. What led to Bohm’s theory was a problem about the difficulty of repre-
senting information from macroscopic classically described measuring instruments in
a phase space theory that could account for the behaviour of the measuring instruments
as well as the phenomena revealed by these instruments. If the C∗-algebra is commu-
tative, there is a phase space representation of the theory—not necessarily the phase
space of classical mechanics, but a theory in which the observables of the C∗-algebra
are replaced by ‘beables’ (Bell’s term, see [2]) or dynamical quantities, and the C∗-
algebraic states are replaced by states representing complete catalogues of properties
(idempotent quantities). In this case, it is possible to extend the theory to include the
measuring instruments that are the source of the C∗-algebraic statistics, so that they
are no longer ‘black boxes’ but constructed out of systems that are characterized by
properties and states of the phase space theory. That is, the C∗-algebraic theory can be
replaced by a ‘detached observer’ theory of the physical processes underlying the phe-
nomena, to use Pauli’s term [30], including the processes involved in the functioning
of measuring instruments. Note that this depends on a representation theorem. In the
noncommutative case, we are guaranteed only the existence of a Hilbert space repre-
sentation of the C∗-algebra, and the possibility of a ‘detached observer’ description of
the phenomena is a further question to be investigated.
In a review of Cushing’s [10], di Salle [12, p. 755] quotes Pauli as remarking in
his Theory of Relativity [30, p. vi] that the ether ‘had to be given up, not only because
it turned out to be unobservable, but because it became superfluous as an element of
a mathematical formalism, the group-theoretical properties of which would only be
disturbed by it.’ Similarly, Pauli says, the concept of definite particle trajectories or
space-time orbits had to be given up in quantum mechanics ‘not only because the orbits
are unobservable, but because they became superfluous and woud disturb the symmetry
inherent in the general transformation group underlying the mathematical formalism of
the theory.’ DiSalle comments:
Evidently this is neither a simple empiricist rejection of the unobserv-
able, nor an operationalist reduction of the meanings of theoretical terms
to processes of measurement. Instead, it asserts that the purpose of any
formalism in physics is to represent the known lawful behaviour of ob-
servable systems, and that distinctions or symmetries that don’t belong to
observable systems don’t belong to their theoretical representation either.
. . . Thus it seems odd that Cushing should ask, ‘What is it about the for-
malism of quantum mechanics that makes it so difficult to tell a story that
we feel we understand about physical phenomena?’ (p.341). The prob-
lem isn’t with the formalism at all; the project of telling such a story is
orthogonal to that of the formalism, which is to represent the structure of
the physical world as it actually reveals itself to us. That structure may
appear bizarre, but its bizarre aspects are necessarily incorporated into de-
terministic alternatives to quantum mechanics. Moreover, to regard the
uncertainty relations as a kind of natural ‘conspiracy’ to hide the under-
lying determinism must have seemed, to Pauli et al., precisely as odd as
accepting the Lorentz contraction instead of special relativity, and for pre-
cisely the same reason. So, instead of Cushing’s question, one could ask,
what is it about physical reality that makes it difficult to represent it by a
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deterministic theory? Why is it that any empirically adequate determinis-
tic theory must be so constructed as to mimic an indeterministic theory in
every conceivable empirical circumstance?
DiSalle’s question is answered by the CBH characterization of quantum mechan-
ics in terms of information-theoretic principles. The rejection of ‘detached observer’
hidden variable theories in favour of quantum mechanics requires that our measuring
instruments ultimately remain black boxes at some level. That is, a quantum descrip-
tion will have to introduce a ‘cut’ between what we take to be the ultimate measuring
instrument in a given measurement process and the quantum phenomenon revealed by
the instrument, which means that the ultimate measuring instrument is treated simply
as a probabilistic source of a range of labelled events or ‘outcomes,’ i.e., effectively
as a source of information in Shannon’s sense. But this amounts to treating quantum
mechanics as a theory about the representation and manipulation of information con-
strained by the possibilities and impossibilities of information-transfer in our world (a
fundamental change in the aim of physics), rather than a theory about the behavior of
nonclassical waves and particles.
Something like this view seems to be implicit in Bohr’s complementarity interpre-
tation of quantum theory. For Bohr, quantum mechanics is complete and there is no
measurement problem, but measuring instruments ultimately remain outside the quan-
tum description: the placement of the ‘cut’ between system and measuring instrument
is arbitrary, but the cut must be placed somewhere. Similarly, the argument here is that,
if the information-theoretic constraints hold in our world, the measurement problem
is a pseudo-problem, and the whole idea of an empirically equivalent ‘interpretation’
of quantum theory that ‘solves the measurement problem’ is to miss the point of the
quantum revolution.
So a consequence of rejecting ‘detached observer’ hidden variable theories is that
we recognize information as a new physical primitive, not reducible to the properties of
particles or fields. An entangled state should be thought of as a new sort of nonclassical
communication channel that we have discovered to exist in our universe, i.e., as a new
sort of ‘wire.’ We can use these communication channels to do things that would be
impossible otherwise, e.g., to teleport states, to compute in new ways, etc. Quantum
theory is then about the properties of these communication channels, and about the
representation and manipulation of states as sources of information in this physical
sense.
The question: ‘What is information in the physical sense (if it is not reducible to
the properties of particles or fields)?’ should be seen as like the question: ‘What is
a field in the physical sense (if it is not reducible to the motion of particles or a me-
chanical medium)?’ The answer is something like this: Quantum mechanics represents
the discovery that there are new sorts of information sources and communication chan-
nels in nature (represented by quantum states), and the theory is about the properties
of these information sources and communication channels. You can, if you like, tell
a mechanical story about quantum phenomena (via Bohm’s theory, for example) but
such a story, if constrained by the information-theoretic principles, can have no excess
empirical content over quantum mechanics, and the additional non-quantum structural
elements will be explanatorily superfluous. So the mechanical story for quantum phe-
nomena is like an ether story for electromagnetic fields. Just as the ether story attempts
to make sense of the behaviour of fields by proposing an ether that is a sort of sui
generis mechanical system different from all other mechanical systems, so a Bohmian
story attempts to make sense of quantum phenomena by introducing a field (the quan-
tum potential or guiding field) that is a sort of sui generis field different from other
14
physical fields.2
Cushing [10, p. 204] quotes Lorentz (from the conclusion of the 1916 edition of
The Theory of Electrons) as complaining that ‘Einstein simply postulates what we have
deduced.’
I cannot speak here of the many highly interesting applications which Ein-
stein has made of this principle [of relativity]. His results concerning elec-
tromagnetic and optical phenomena ... agree in the main with those which
we have obtained in the preceding pages, the chief difference being that
Einstein simply postulates what we have deduced, with some difficulty
and not altogether satisfactorily, from the fundamental equations of the
electromagnetic field. By doing so, he may certainly take credit for mak-
ing us see in the negative result of experiments like those of Michelson,
Rayleigh and Brace, not a fortuitous compensation of opposing effects,
but the manifestation of a general and fundamental principle.
Yet, I think, something may also be claimed in favour of the form in which
I have presented the theory. I cannot but regard the aether, which can be
the seat of an electromagnetic field with its energy and its vibrations, as
endowed with a certain degree of substantiality, however different it may
be from all ordinary matter. In this line of thought, it seems natural not
to assume at starting that it can never make any difference whether a body
moves through the aether or not, and to measure distances and lengths of
time by means of rods and clocks having a fixed position relative to the
aether.
Similarly, one might complain that CBH simply postulate what is ultimately ex-
plained by a Bohmian (or other ‘no collapse’) theory. Just as the rejection of Lorentz’s
complaint involves taking the field as a new physical primitive (tantamount to ‘no
ether,’ which follows once we accept the principles of special relativity as basic to
an explanatory account of electromagnetic phenomena), so the rejection of the anal-
ogous complaint in the quantum case involves taking information as a new physi-
cal primitive (tantamount to ‘measuring instruments are ultimately to be treated as
black boxes,’ which follows—via the ‘no go’ theorems—once we accept the three
information-theoretic constraints as basic to an explanatory account of quantum phe-
nomena).
To conclude, it might be worthwhile clarifying what is not being argued here.
Firstly, the CBH theorem should not be understood as providing a ‘constructive’ ex-
planation for the quantum formalism, along the lines suggested by Chris Fuchs [15]
(or the axiomatization proposed by Lucien Hardy [20], or by quantum logicians), but
rather as a ‘principled’ reconstruction of the theory within a suitably general math-
ematical framework. Secondly, the claim that quantum mechanics is about quantum
information—that quantum mechanics is a principle theory of information (in the sense
in which Einstein regarded special relativity as a principle theory)—and that this phys-
ical notion of information is not reducible to the properties of particles or fields, is not
to be construed as the claim that quantum mechanics is about observers and their epis-
temological concerns, nor that we have derived ‘it from bit’ in Wheeler’s sense [36]
of a ‘participatory universe,’ nor that the basic stuff of the world is informational in
an intentional sense. (Recall Shannon’s remark [33, p.31] that ‘the semantic aspects
of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem’—it is the ‘engineering’
sense of information that is relevant to the CBH theorem.) Rather, the claim is that the
2In fact, in [4, section 3.2] Bohm and Hiley suggest that the guiding field should be understood as a sort
of informational field.
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lesson of modern physics is that a principle theory is the best one can hope to achieve
as an explanatory account of quantum phenomena.
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